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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case, Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
The state submits this Supplemental Respondent's Brief to address Austin's 
supplemental arguments that the district court erred by: (1) denying his Motion to 
Dismiss Warrant (Ltd. R., 1 p.18), and (2) denying his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction (Ltd. R., pp.45-47). The nature of the case, statement of facts and course 
of proceedings are set forth in the Respondent's Brief and are incorporated herein by 
reference. With some overlap to provide context, the following additional facts and 
proceedings are relevant to Austin's supplemental argument. 
On March 19, 2001, pursuant to a plea agreement, Austin pied guilty to ten 
counts of felony issuance of an Insufficient Funds Check. (R., Vol. 1, pp.239-243, 246-
248; see generally 3/19/01 Tr.) On April 1·6, 2001, the district court verbally sentenced 
Austin to "a minimum of two years and a maximum of three years" on each count, 
consecutive, and placed Austin on probation for ten years. (4/16/01 Tr., p.29, L.6 -
p.30, L.2.) However, the subsequent written Judgment of Conviction provided that each 
of the underlying consecutive sentences were two years determinate followed by 
indeterminate terms of three years. (R., Vol. 1, pp.275-277.) On October 19, 2001, the 
district court corrected Austin's written judgment by filing an Amended Judgment of 
Conviction to reflect that Austin was sentenced to ten consecutive sentences of three 
years with two years fixed. (R., Vol. 1, pp.327-339.) Austin filed a notice of appeal (R., 
Vol. 1, pp.289-291 ), which, in an unpublished decision by the Idaho Court of Appeals, 
was dismissed for being untimely filed (R., Vol. 1, pp.349-350). 
1 "Ltd. R.," refers to the "Limited Clerk's Record on Appeal." 
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On April 12, 2013, Austin filed a pro se "Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence 
Pursuant [to] Rule 35(a)," claiming that the district court was bound by Austin's Rule 11 
plea agreement to order that the sentences run concurrent. (R., Vol. 1, pp.423-426.) 
After the parties filed competing memoranda (R., Vol. 1, pp.455-470, 483-484), and a 
hearing (see generally 6/20/13 Tr.), the district court issued a written opinion denying 
Austin's Rule 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence (R., Vol. 1, pp.486-494). On 
October 15, 2013, Austin filed a timely appeal. (R., Vol. 1, pp.495-496, 510-511.) 
On May 19, 2014, Austin filed a Motion to Dismiss Warrant, contending that, 
because he had "demanded a speedy disposition on this matter" and "has not had such 
a trial, the warrant requires dismissal with prejudice, pursuant to the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers, and Idaho Statute 19-5001." (Ltd. R., p.18.) A bench warrant 
for a probation violation and a detainer had been filed against Austin in 2010, who was 
in federal custody in Mississippi. (Ltd. R., pp.30-34.) 
On June 19, 2014, Austin filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Ltd. 
R., pp.45-47), arguing: (1) the sentence set forth in the original Judgment of Conviction 
"was illegal and sentence [sic] was not imposed until Court [sic] corrected the 
judgement" [sic] because it "imposed a sentence of 5 years in prison" for each of the ten 
counts, which exceeded the three-year statutory maximum; (2) because the October 19, 
2001 amended judgment constituted a sentencing or resentencing, his presence was 
required under I.C. § 10-2503 and I.C.R. 43(a); and (3) because Austin was not present 
at his October 19, 2001 sentencing, the district court did not have jurisdiction to either 
sentence him on that date or to subsequently "cause a warrant and detainer to be 
issued" for a probation violation (Ltd. R., pp.45-46). 
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The court held a hearing on Austin's motions on July 2, 2014, in which Austin 
participated pro se and via telephone. (See generally 7/2/14 Tr.) At the end of the 
hearing, the district court denied Austin's two motions. (Ltd. R., pp.48-49, 53-54, 57-58, 
61-62; 7/2/14 Tr., p.12, L.18 - p.13, L.22; p.20, L.20 - p. 22, L.8.) Austin filed a timely 
notice of appeal. (Ltd. R., p.50.) 
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
Austin Has Failed To Show Any Error In The District Court's Denial Of His Motions To 
Dismiss For Lack Of Jurisdiction And To Quash The Warrant 
Austin first argues that his Amended Judgment of Conviction, filed by the district 
court on October 19, 2001 (R., Vol. 1, pp.327-339) constituted a "resentencing" hearing 
which required his presence. (Appellant's Supp. Brief, p.3 ("It was a resentencing 
because the District Court changed material facts that could have been appealable.").) 
However, as explained previously (see Appellant's Brief, pp.5-9; Appendix A), the 
district court properly corrected the initial written Judgment of Conviction to reflect the 
actual sentences pronounced at sentencing. Under I.C.R. 36 the court had authority to 
correct the clerical error "at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders." 
Because the Amended Judgment of Conviction served only to correct the length of 
Austin's unified sentences, and the correction from five to three years inured to Austin's 
benefit, the court did not abuse its discretion by making the correction without notice 
and without Austin's presence. Stated differently, Austin was neither "sentenced" nor 
"resentenced" by virtue of the Amended Judgment of Conviction; therefore, his 
presence was not required. 
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In sum, because the district court's oral pronouncement of Austin's sentences is 
controlling, and because the initial judgment of conviction did not accurately reflect the 
court's pronouncement of lesser unified sentences, the court was entitled to correct the 
clerical error without Austin's presence. See I.C.R. 36. This Court should uphold the 
district court's order denying Austin's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
Alternatively, even if Rule 36 did not give the district court authority to correct 
Austin's sentence, Rule 35(a) did. On its face, the original Judgment of Conviction 
imposed an illegal sentence because the unified five-year terms exceeded the statutory 
maximum of three-year terms for Insufficient Funds Check charges.2 See I.C. § 18-
3106(a) (prison term is not to exceed three years). The state relies on the reasoning of 
the district court, which correctly explained: 
While I've listened to this argument, the one thing that you seem to 
be missing, Mr. Austin, is the provision of Idaho Criminal Rule 43(c)(4). 
However, Rule 43(c)(4) specifically provides that, when the Court 
takes action pursuant to Rule 35 to reduce the sentence to correct an 
illegality, the presence of the defendant is not required. 
That's what occurred here. Once it came to my attention that there 
had been a clerical mistake made in the judgment -- and it was contrary to 
my notes, but a clerical mistake was made in the judgment with the wrong 
number of years -- I fixed it. I reduced the sentence under subsection (1) 
of Rule 35, which is my entitlement at any time. I maintained jurisdiction 
throughout the pendency of the case to do such. Rule 13 of the appellate 
rules is clear that I still have continuing jurisdiction to do that even though 
there's a pending appeal. 
And under Rule 43(c)(4), I do not need to have the defendant 
present or even conduct a formal proceeding in order to do so. 
2 Additionally, the five-year unified sentences set forth in the initial Judgment of 
Conviction are illegal because, as discussed, they do not accurately reflect the district 
court's oral pronouncement of the sentences. 
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So there's no merit to this argument. Motion is denied. 
(7/2/14 Tr., p.12, L.18- p.13, L.22.) 
The district court properly denied Austin's motion. Inasmuch as the initial written 
Judgment of Conviction incorrectly stated that unified terms of Austin's sentences were 
five years (and more than the three-year maximum) instead of accurately reflecting 
three years as pronounced in open court, the written judgment ordered "a sentence that 
is illegal from the face of the record[,]" subject to being corrected "at any time." I.C.R. 
35(a); see State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875, 877-878, 172 P.3d 1150, 1152-1153 (Ct. App. 
2007) (words pronounced in open court control over words in written order). Because 
the district court's correction of Austin's unified terms constituted "a reduction of 
sentence under Rule 35[,]" Austin's presence was not required. I.C.R. 43(c)(4). 
Secondly, the district court correctly dismissed Austin's Motion to Dismiss 
Warrant, which Austin based upon the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and I.C. § 19-
5001 ("Interstate Agreement on Detainers," or "IAD"). (See Ltd. R., p.18.) The court 
ruled that the IAD does not apply to probation violations, explaining: 
You are in the custody of the Federal Government. Even though 
Idaho and the Federal Government might be signatories to the Interstate 
Compact on Detainers or the IAD, that act or that compact only applies to 
the ability of one requesting state to demand that a holding state tender a 
defendant to the requesting state for purposes of returning to the 
requesting state to face trial of a pending criminal matter. That must be 
done within six months of the request. And upon conviction, if there is a 
conviction, the defendant is returned to the offering state to finish serving 
out the sentence there before returning to the requesting state to serve 
whatever sentence is going to be imposed. 
It's designed to be something that facilitates speedy trial of untried 
matters. It does not apply to probation violations. 
And what you're suggesting is that I ought to stretch that law out of 
some equity consideration and bring you back under the detainer law, 
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even though you're facing an untried matter. There's simply no 
mechanism to do that, because the two jurisdictions which are signatory to 
the compact don't provide for that. So that manner that that must be dealt 
with is that you serve your time where you are; then you come back here 
and deal with whatever you've got to deal with here. That's the way the 
law is structured. I have no power to do otherwise. 
So that motion will be denied. 
(7/2/14 Tr., p.21, L.5 - p.22, L.8.) 
The district court accurately determined that the IAD does not apply to probation 
violations. In Swain v. State, 122 Idaho 918, 920, 841 P .2d 448, 450 (Ct. App. 1993), 
the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
It is undisputed that one of the purposes behind the act relating to 
interstate detainers is to encourage speedier dispositions of untried 
prosecutions for the adjudication of guilt following the commission of a 
crime and reduce the continuation of unsubstantiated charges which may 
have a detrimental effect on a prisoner's treatment. To the contrary, a 
probation violation proceeding may well be based on the prisoner's 
commission of the crime that resulted in his conviction and incarceration in 
the "sending" state and, because the conviction conclusively establishes 
the probation violation, the probation violation charge will not be 
unsubstantiated. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 730-31, 105 S.Ct. 
3401, 3409, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). Accordingly, the Interstate 
Agreement on Detainers Act does not apply to warrants or detainers 
asserting claims of alleged violation of probation. Id. at 734, 105 S.Ct. at 
3410. 
See also State v. Miller, 134 Idaho 458, 463, 4 P.3d 570, 575 (Ct. App. 2000) ("[W]e 
hold that in Idaho the I.AD., as set forth in I.C. §§ 19-5001 to -5008, is inapplicable to 
sentencing detainers. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Miller's motion 
to dismiss based on an alleged violation of the I.AD."). 
Because the IAD is not applicable to probation violations, the district court's 
denial of Austin's motion to dismiss the warrant of detention must be affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, as well as in the initial Brief of Respondent, the 
state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's orders denying 
Austin's Motion to Dismiss Warrant of Detention and his Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction. 
DATED this 1ih day of December, 2014. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 1ih day of December, 2014, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be 
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
WESLEY WAYNE AUSTIN 
#09353-073 
Federal Correctional Institution 
P.O. BOX 5000 
Oakdale, LA 71463 
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